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In this paper we study the determinants of the strength of patent enforcement in 
43 member countries of the World Trade Organization (WTO) between 1998 and 
2011, a period after the signing of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) agreement. We do so by building on and expanding the seminal work 
of Ginarte and Park (1997) on the pre-TRIPS determinants of patent rights in the 
years 1960-1990. We find that in the years after TRIPS was signed, the strength of 
patent enforcement of a country is positively determined by two variables that signify 
the usage of the patent and intellectual property system, the number of patent and 
trademark applications. We also find that the level of research and development 
expenditure, the quality of human capital, and the level of development of a country 
have positive effects on the strength of the enforcement of patent law in practice. 
Intellectual property rights enforcement is one of the key investment-related 
policies included in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development. Identifying 
the determinants of strong patent systems will help policymakers at the national 
and supranational levels to design and implement effective policies that strengthen 
national patent systems, thereby enhancing economic benefits such as greater 
levels of commercialization of intangible assets and greater levels of international 
trade and investment.
Keywords: patent rights; patent system; patent law; patent enforcement; TRIPS  
1. Introduction
The signing of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
agreement in 1994 was a key milestone and turning point for the evolution of 
stronger patent systems in World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries. 
The TRIPS agreement set the minimum regulatory standards of intellectual property 
(IP) protection with an aim to “reduce distortions and impediments to international 
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trade” (WTO, 2018). This was because the strength of a country’s patent system 
is an important factor that affects international investments by influencing e.g. 
the level and extent to which transnational corporations consider investing in and 
transferring advanced technological assets to a host country (UNCTAD, 2010, 
2013, 2015). Effective national patent systems comprise of two components: (a) 
the strength of patent law on the books, and (b) the strength of the enforcement of 
patent law in practice (Papageorgiadis and McDonald, 2019). Since the signing of 
TRIPS, patent law protection in developed and developing WTO member countries 
has strengthened significantly and become more harmonized (Taubman et al., 
2012). While differences in patent legislation do exist, the divergence, especially in 
terms of minimum standards, is not as wide as it used to be prior to the signing of 
TRIPS (Park, 2008). 
In contrast, the implementation of the TRIPS agreement did not affect the levels 
of strength of the enforcement of patent law in practice, in the way that this is 
e.g. applied by public enforcement agents (Brander et al., 2017). Although the 
TRIPS agreement set clear requirements for the inclusion of specific enforcement 
procedures in the legislative frameworks of countries, it did not set obligations on 
how effectively patent law should be enforced in practice (WTO, 2018). Therefore, 
although a strong patent legislative framework may exist in the post-TRIPS patent 
system of a particular country, these laws may not be enforced in practice by public 
enforcement agents (Arora, 2009). As a result there are still wide differences in 
the levels of patent enforcement strength between countries (Papageorgiadis et 
al., 2014), and these differences have now become the dominant factor of the 
divergence between the patent systems of WTO member countries after the signing 
of TRIPS (Correa, 2009; Fink, 2009). In fact, weak levels of patent enforcement 
strength are commonly identified as an impediment to international trade and 
investment, turning the levels of patent enforcement strength into a common area 
of discussion in bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations (Papageorgiadis et al., 
2014; Alexiou et al., 2016). For example, in the recent trade dispute between the 
United States and China, the Trump administration announced “plans for a 25 per 
cent tariff on 1,333 Chinese products ranging from industrial robots to locomotives 
in retaliation for what it said had been decades of state-backed [IP] theft by Beijing” 
(Financial Times, 2018).
Identifying the key factors that contribute to the strengthening of patent law protection 
and enforcement can help policymakers design and implement effective policies 
that will strengthen the patent system of their country or region. Strengthening a 
country’s patent system to a level that is compatible with a country’s development 
and technological capabilities is desirable as this is expected to boost economic 
growth, by attracting higher levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) and innovation, 
and lead to greater levels of commercialization of intangible assets (Pereira, 2006; 
UNCTAD, 2015). For instance, the strength of the United Kingdom’s IP system has 
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enabled growth in IP-protected intangible assets investments from £47 billion in 
2000 to £70 billion in 2014 (UK IP Office, 2017). The potential benefits of strong 
patent systems have motivated the IP offices of some countries to design detailed 
strategic actions with an aim to improve their IP systems. Such was the case with 
the 10-year IP master plan of Singapore, which initiated policies that can enable 
Singapore to strengthen its IP system and become an IP hub in the region. The 
reforms it implemented involved giving research and development (R&D) incentives 
to small and medium-sized companies, upgrading the IP capabilities and expertise 
of the local workforce, and boosting the number of patent applications in the country 
(Government of Singapore and Intellectual Property Office of Singapore, 2017). 
Similarly, China’s 12th five-year plan (2011-2015) incentivized Chinese firms to 
make use of the patent system by subsidizing the cost of patent applications (U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2011). The main expectation 
for such subsidies is that as the number of patent owners in a country rises, this 
will increase the pressure on public patent enforcement agents to enforce patent 
law more effectively in practice (Yang et al., 2004). The outcome of such initiatives 
takes time to materialize, and therefore the transition of a country’s patent system 
from weak to strong is expected to take years or even decades (Peng et al., 2017). 
The determinants of patent protection strength was the focus of the seminal work 
by Ginarte and Park (1997), which has been cited more than 1,500 times according 
to Google Scholar.1 They investigated the determinants of patent protection of 
110 countries in 1960-1990, a time period prior to the signing of the TRIPS 
agreement, and found that R&D activity, market freedom and openness were 
important determinants of the strength of national patent law protection as it appears 
on the books. In other words, these three factors were important characteristics 
of countries that offered strong patent law protection pre-TRIPS. However, two 
decades after the publication of Ginarte and Park’s study, and after the signing and 
implementation of TRIPS, patent systems have evolved considerably, and there 
is no updated empirical evidence regarding the determinants of (a) the strength 
of patent law protection, and (b) the strength of the enforcement of patent law in 
practice in the post-TRIPS period. 
In this research note we update and expand the study by Ginarte and Park (1997) 
and make two contributions to the international business literature studying patent 
systems. First, we study the previously unidentified determinants of the strength of 
enforcement of patent law in practice for 43 WTO member countries in the post-
TRIPS years, 1998-2011. We follow the same methodology as Ginarte and Park; 
however, we use the composite index of patent systems strength developed by 
Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) to approximate for the strength of the enforcement 
1 1,568 citations as of November 2018.
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of patent law in practice (Ahammad et al., 2018; Papageorgiadis et al., 2019).2 
We find strong and consistent evidence that higher numbers of patent and 
trademark applications filed in a country have a significantly positive effect on the 
strengthening of the enforcement of patent law in practice. In addition, we find that 
R&D expenditure, the level of economic development and the quality of human 
capital also stimulate the strengthening of patent enforcement. Second, we update 
the Ginarte and Park study by investigating the determinants of the strength of 
protection of patent law in the period after TRIPS. We find consistent evidence that 
the level of R&D expenditure in a country and the level of economic development 
continue to be two important determinants of the strength of patent law in WTO 
member countries in the post-TRIPS time period. We also find evidence to suggest 
that the quality of human capital in a country is a new post-TRIPS determinant of 
the strength of patent law. 
In the next section, we briefly discuss the two complementary measures used as 
proxies for two distinct aspects of the strength of patent systems, the strength of 
patent enforcement and the strength of patent law on the books (Papageorgiadis 
and Sharma, 2016). Following the Ginarte and Park (1997) empirical approach, in 
section three we present the empirical model, estimation, and variables applied 
and focus the discussion on the additional (contemporary) variables that we 
incorporated in the estimation. We provide the results and discussion of the findings 
in section four. In section five, we discuss the policy implications of the study and 
make suggestions for future research. 
2. Measures
The dependent variable for the estimation of the determinants of the strength of 
patent law is the version of the Ginarte and Park (1997) index updated by Park 
(2008). This version of the index is the most widely used in empirical studies in the 
literature. The scores of the Park (2008) index capture the availability of patent-
related legislation that enables the functioning of a patent system. The index is 
composed of five components that capture the (i) granting of patent rights for 
specific innovations, (ii) signatory status of a country to international treaties that are 
relevant to patent rights (such as TRIPS), (iii) duration of protection for the patent 
rights granted, (iv) availability of legal mechanisms that can enable the enforcement 
of patent rights and, (v) legislation that can potentially restrict patent rights. The 
unweighted sum of these five components determines the overall score for each of 
the countries included in the index. 
2 The index of Ginarte and Park and its update by Park (2008) measure the strength of patent law 
protection in a country but not the strength of patent enforcement (Brander et al., 2017). 
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We use the index by Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) as the dependent variable for 
the estimation of the strength of the enforcement of patent law in national patent 
systems in practice. It is important to note that the fourth component of the Ginarte 
and Park (1997) index, which captures the availability of legislation that can enable 
the enforcement of patent rights, has been commonly misperceived as a measure 
of patent enforcement strength (Arora, 2009; Brander et al., 2017). In fact, as Park 
(2008, p. 761) highlights in the latest update of the index: “This index was designed 
to provide an indicator of strength of patent protection, not the quality of patent 
systems”. In contrast, the Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) index uses both reports 
and perceptions of effectiveness to measure the strength of the enforcement of 
patent law in practice in the time period since the signing of TRIPS (Papageorgiadis 
and McDonald, 2019). It is the only longitudinal index to do so, and in so doing, 
this composite indicator measures the strength of eight enforcement-related 
components of national patent systems, thereby providing the most comprehensive 
approximation for the overall strength of enforcement of patent law in practice in 
the literature. 
Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) developed the index following methodological 
recommendations from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (2008). The authors applied a transaction cost rationale to map how 
ineffective enforcement activities, administration, and governing of enforcement-
related aspects of a national patent system increase the transaction costs that 
patent owners face in 48 countries. The index scores are derived using secondary 
data that proxy for three types of transaction costs: (a) the servicing costs faced 
by patent owners in terms of the quality of patent administration in a given country, 
(b) the property rights protection costs incurred as a result of the ineffectiveness of 
the judiciary and the judicial process in a country, and (c) the monitoring costs that 
originate from the ineffectiveness of public and private agencies (e.g. police and 
customs) in enforcing patent rights, as well as the overall societal attitudes towards 
the enforcement-related aspects of patent rights which dictate the acceptability of 
enforcement actions in a given country. 
3. Empirical model and estimation
As noted, the empirical approach of this research note follows the Ginarte and 
Park (1997) study. However, the difference is that we consider the determinants 
of the strength of patent law as well as the determinants of the strength of patent 
enforcement. The estimation is based on a panel of 43 WTO member countries for 
the period 1998-2011, and the estimation model can be written as follows:
yit=a+xit+uit (1)
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where y is the proxy of the strength of either patent law (first set of regressions, 
focusing on the determinants of the strength of patent law only) or the enforcement 
of patent law in practice (second set of regressions, focusing on the determinants 
of the strength of the enforcement of patent law in practice), x is the vector of 
all explanatory variables, lagged by one year to control for potential endogeneity 
(except for political freedom) and uit is the error term.3 With regards to the 
explanatory variables, we include the same variables as those used by the Ginarte 
and Park (1997) study in all specifications. These are (i) GDP per capita, to proxy 
for the level of economic development (World Bank, 2015a); (ii) R&D expenditure 
as a percentage of GDP (World Bank, 2015b); (iii) secondary education enrolment 
rate, to proxy for the quality of human capital (World Bank, 2015c); (iv) the Index of 
Economic Freedom, to proxy for the level of market freedom in a country (Heritage 
Foundation, 2015); (v) the sum of volume of exports and imports of a country over 
GDP, to proxy for the openness of the economy (World Bank, 2015d, 2015e), 
given that the data of Sachs et al. (1995) used by Ginarte and Park have not been 
updated with contemporary values; (vi) the political rights data made available by 
the Freedom House (2015), to proxy for political freedom as the political freedom 
data of Barro and Lee (1994) (used by Ginarte and Park, 1997) are not available for 
any of the years considered in our study. 
Further to the variables included in the Ginarte and Park (1997) study, we also take 
into account the potential effects of three additional variables which have become 
increasingly important in the time period studied. First, we consider the potential 
effects of the number of patent applications per capita and the number of trademark 
applications of residents and non-residents (WIPO, 2015). Higher levels of patent 
and trademark applications in a country indicate the desire of local and foreign 
companies to gain protection for their IP, as well as to (potentially) effectively enforce 
their legal rights in practice (Desyllas and Sako, 2013). Higher levels of patent and 
trademark applications in a country are therefore expected to have a positive effect 
on the strength of patent law and the strength of the enforcement of patent law in 
practice. Second, we use a proxy measure for the level of foreign direct investment 
(FDI), defined as the sum of foreign assets and liabilities as a ratio of GDP (World 
Bank, 2015f). This is because FDI commonly involves the transfer of technology 
3 Our data set consists of the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Chile, China, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong 
Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, 
Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey 
and the United Kingdom. The number of countries included in our estimations is determined by the 
availability of data of the Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) index, which provides annual index scores for 
the years 1998-2011, for a maximum of 43 countries. Our data set therefore includes 43 countries 
whereas the Ginarte and Park (1997) data set included 48.
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from the headquarters of a company to a subsidiary in the host market (Dunning 
and Zhang, 2008). Foreign firms frequently apply pressure to local governments 
to strengthen patent law and the enforcement of patent law in practice, so that 
they can retain the same business model as the one used in their home country 
and successfully appropriate the returns from their innovations in the host country 
(Zhang et al., 2010). 
Table 1 and figure 1 summarise the description of the variables together with the 
measures used and the sources of the data. Table 2 provides the descriptive 
statistics and Table 3 the correlation coefficients matrix.4
4 To consider the potential for multicollinearity, we conducted the variance inflation factor test for all 
specifications. The scores are all below 10, indicating that multicollinearity is not a concern. 
Table 1. Variable description, measurement and sources
Variable Description/Measurement Data Source
Patent law strength Index by Park (2008) Park (2008)
Enforcement strength 
of patent law 
Index by Papageorgiadis et al. (2014)
Papageorgiadis et al. 
(2014)
GDP per capita Logarithm of real GDP per capita World Bank (2015a)
R&D / GDP % of research and development expenditure over GDP World Bank (2015b)
Secondary enrolment % of population that it is enrolled in secondary schools World Bank (2015c)
Political freedom
Measure of political risk in which higher values indicate a 
riskier environment
Freedom House 
(2015)
Market freedom
Measure of market freedom in which higher values indicate 
more freedom in business transactions
Heritage Foundation 
(2015)
Openness Sum of volume of exports plus imports over GDP
World Bank (2015d, 
2015e)
Trademark applications 
per capita
Logarithm of applications to register a trademark with a 
national or regional intellectual property (IP) office over 
population
WIPO (2015)
FDI / GDP Sum of foreign assets and liabilities over GDP World Bank (2015f)
Patent applications 
per capita
Logarithm of worldwide patent applications filed through the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty procedure or with a national patent 
office for exclusive rights for an invention over population
WIPO (2015)
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Figure 1. Determinants of strength of patent law and strength of patent 
 law enforcement 
Patent 
Law Strength
Strength of 
Patent Law 
Enforcement
Factors determining incentives
• Factors affecting aggregate output level: 
 (i) human capital, (ii) R&D investment
• Factors affecting aggregate price level:
 (i) openness to trade, (ii) market freedom, 
 (iii) political freedom. 
• Infrastructure cost: developing and 
 operating patent law infrastructure 
 (relative to national income per capita)
Pressure factors
• Pressure from intellectual property 
 rights owners who operate in a country: 
 (i) number of patents, 
 (ii) number of trademarks
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Patent law strength 3.987 0.662 1.08 4.67
Enforcement strength of patent law 6.42 2.126 2.6 9.9
GDP per capita 9.486 1.191 6.271 11.124
R&D / GDP 1.441 1.082 0.01 4.835
Secondary enrolment 96.747 13.476 42.298 160.619
Political freedom 1.804 1.475 1 7
Market freedom 74.213 12.979 36.3 100
Openness 88.083 57.086 18.756 446.754
Trademark applications per capita 0.046 0.099 0.002 1.307
FDI / GDP 0.817 1.153 0.04 11.034
Patent applications per capita 0.05 0.074 0.004 0.355
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Table 4. Regression results for the determinants of the strength of patent law
(1)
Patent law strength 
(2)
Patent law strength
(3)
Patent law strength
GDP per capita 0.358*** 0.349*** 0.376***[0.0315] [0.0290] [0.0323]
R&D / GDP
0.0556*** 0.0573** 0.0535**
[0.0215] [0.0233] [0.0214]
Secondary enrolment
0.00149* 0.00232*** 0.00173**
[0.000869] [0.000820] [0.000861]
Political freedom
0.00398 0.00522 0.00348
[0.00999] [0.00939] [0.0100]
Market freedom
-0.00231*** -0.00197*** -0.00218***
[0.000684] [0.000652] [0.000679]
Openness
-0.000558 -0.000621* -0.000593*
[0.000359] [0.000345] [0.000356]
Trademark applications per capita
-0.440*** -0.270*
[0.137] [0.158]
FDI / GDP
0.0183 0.0256* 0.0205
[0.0157] [0.0145] [0.0155]
Patent applications per capita
-0.409 -0.705**
[0.310] [0.316]
Constant
0.498* 0.495* 0.333
[0.285] [0.269] [0.293]
LR (Heteroscedasticity) Test 559.12*** 621.70*** 568.09***
Wooldridge (Autocorrelation) Test 2012.432*** 1000.628 961.833***
No. of observations 546 559 546
1. Standard errors in brackets.
2. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
3.  Feasible general least squares estimator is applied, assuming a heteroskedastic error structure with no cross-sectional correlation and AR(1).
4. Results
Given the presence of country heterogeneity in our sample, we adopted a panel data 
analysis approach. In the first set of regressions (table 4) we use the Park (2008) index, 
which proxies for the strength of patent law as our dependent variable. Subsequently, 
we repeat the same set of estimations (table 5) using the Papageorgiadis et al. 
(2014) index, which proxies for the strength of enforcement of patent law in practice. 
We applied the feasible general least squares estimator, controlling for panel 
heteroscedasticity and first-order autocorrelation. The common characteristic of the 
three specifications is that we always include the proxies of the variables originally 
used in the Ginarte and Park (1997) study. Our specifications consider the variables 
included in that study together with two or all three of the contemporary variables 
discussed in section three. More precisely, the first specification (column 1) includes 
all the variables considered by Ginarte and Park (1997) plus FDI and trademark 
applications per capita. The second specification (column 2) replaces trademark 
applications per capita with patent applications per capita. The third estimation 
(column 3) includes all variables considered in our study. 
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4.1 Determinants of the strength of patent law 
The results of the estimations focusing on the determinants of the strength of 
patent law reveal that two pre-TRIPS determinants identified in the Ginarte and 
Park (1997) study continue to be significant in the era since the signing of TRIPS. 
More specifically, similar to the finding of Ginarte and Park (1997), we find evidence 
that the GDP per capita and R&D expenditure have a positive and significant effect 
on the strength of patent law protection. The logarithm of real GDP is positive and 
statistically significant at 1 per cent in all specifications, and the same positive sign 
is also found for the R&D expenditure (p < 5%) variable. Therefore, similarly to the 
situation in the pre-TRIPS years, the level of economic development and the amount 
Table 5.  Regression results for the determinants of the strength of patent law 
enforcement in practice
(1)
Enforcement strength 
of patent law 
(2)
Enforcement strength 
of patent law
(3)
Enforcement strength 
of patent law
GDP per capita
0.956*** 1.179*** 0.929***
[0.0613] [0.0705] [0.0599]
R&D / GDP
0.427*** 0.246*** 0.373***
[0.0642] [0.0642] [0.0668]
Secondary enrolment
0.00516** 0.00876*** 0.00542**
[0.00231] [0.00212] [0.00225]
Political freedom
-0.0380 -0.0347 -0.0389*
[0.0239] [0.0222] [0.0227]
Market freedom
0.00194 0.00392** 0.00196
[0.00216] [0.00199] [0.00216]
Openness
0.0000661 0.00100 -0.000152
[0.000849] [0.000741] [0.000816]
Trademark applications per capita
0.164*** 0.140***
[0.0305] [0.0304]
FDI / GDP
0.0950*** 0.0154 0.0849***
[0.0328] [0.0283] [0.0306]
Patent applications per capita
0.0617* 0.113***
[0.0319] [0.0321]
Constant
-3.105*** -5.641*** -2.393***
[0.513] [0.619] [0.524]
LR (Heteroscedasticity) Test 419.53*** 435.53*** 460.28***
Wooldridge (Autocorrelation) Test 68.179*** 73.159*** 69.278***
No. of Observations 546 559 546
1. Standard errors in brackets.
2. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
3.   Feasible general least squares estimator is applied, assuming a heteroskedastic error structure with no cross-sectional correlation 
and AR(1).
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of funds invested in R&D activities are significant factors that help strengthen patent 
law protection in all countries in our sample. In addition, while Ginarte and Park 
(1997) found the secondary enrolment variable to have an insignificant effect, we 
find that in the years since the signing of TRIPS the quality of human capital has a 
highly significant positive effect on the strength of patent law (p < 1%). Together, 
these three aspects of a national economy can help create an ecosystem in which 
firms can develop higher-quality intellectual assets that require the granting of patent 
rights so that firms can successfully appropriate the returns on their innovations.
We also find that the variables for market freedom, openness and trademark 
applications per capita have a negative effect on the strength of patent law 
protection, with the effect of market freedom being significantly negative (p < 1%) in 
all specifications. The results for market freedom and openness are contrary to the 
results of the Ginarte and Park (1997) study. This finding reveals that the positive 
association between these two factors and patent law strength since the TRIPS 
signing has been reversed. This might have been caused by the fact that TRIPS 
helped to solve the international coordination problem but at the same time induced 
countries to move away from e.g. the Nash equilibrium degree of IP protection that 
would be predicted by a structured model of trade and innovation (Grossman and 
Lai, 2004). In addition, we found that the three variables of political freedom, FDI 
and patent applications per capita have limited to no statistically significant effect 
across all three estimations (with the exception of FDI in one of the specifications). 
The insignificant effect of the political freedom variable is consistent with the results 
of Ginarte and Park (1997). In contrast, FDI levels and patent applications per 
capita are found to have no significant effect on the strength of patent law. This 
could be because the levels of FDI and numbers of patent applications can be 
mainly considered not as determinants but as outcomes, whose size depends on 
the strength of patent law. Indeed, there is consistent evidence that strengthening 
levels of patent law attract higher levels of FDI and lead to more firms seeking to 
formally register their patent rights in the country (Ushijima, 2013). 
4.2 Determinants of the strength of patent enforcement 
The results of all estimations on the determinants of the strength of enforcement 
of patent law in practice reveal the significant effect of two different factors 
compared with those influencing the strength of patent law protection. The results 
show that the number of patent and trademark applications in a country has a 
significant positive effect (p < 1%) on the strength of patent enforcement in almost 
all specifications. Whereas the number of patent and trademark applications 
was not found to affect the strength of patent law protection, the ability of patent 
owners to register and gain patent and trademark rights for the innovations that 
they commercialize in a country was found to positively affect patent enforcement 
99Factors contributing to the strength of national patent protection and enforcement after TRIPS
strength. This may be because higher volumes of intellectual asset ownership in 
a country could increase the number of requests that public patent enforcement 
agents receive, potentially leading them to increase their efforts, become more 
effective and achieve stronger enforcement of patent law in practice (Desyllas and 
Sako, 2013). This is not the case for the strengthening of patent law protection, 
given that the assigning of patent and trademark rights is an output of patent law 
protection and that most countries already offer TRIPS-level minimum standards 
of legal protection.
The three determinants of the strength of patent law since the TRIPS signing, 
however, were consistently found to have a strong determinant effect on the 
strength of patent enforcement. GDP per capita, R&D expenditure and secondary 
school enrolment consistently had a highly significant positive effect (p < 1%) on 
the strength of the enforcement of patent law in practice. This important finding 
showcases that the determinants of the two aspects of the patent systems of 
countries in the years after the signing of the TRIPS agreement were positively 
affected by similar economic factors. Contrary to these three factors, the results of 
the estimations highlight that the remaining four variables have an insignificant effect 
on the strength of patent enforcement. We found no evidence that the variables 
of political freedom and openness have any significant effect. These results were 
consistent across all estimations. We also found evidence in only one out of three 
estimations that market freedom had a significant effect on the strength of patent 
enforcement. Finally, the FDI variable was found to be statistically significant 
and positive in two out of three estimations. Therefore, there is some evidence 
that FDI might have a positive effect on the strength of enforcement of patent 
law in practice.
5. Conclusions
Twenty years after the publication of the seminal study by Ginarte and Park (1997) 
on the determinants of the strength of patent systems, we revisited and expanded 
their work using data for the post-TRIPS signing time period of 1998-2011. In so 
doing, we made two contributions to the literature. First, we expanded the focus of 
the Ginarte and Park (1997) study by considering the determinants of the strength 
of the enforcement of patent law in practice. The results revealed an important 
insight on what factors influence the strength of patent enforcement in a country, 
in that the number of patent and trademark applications has a positive effect on 
the strength of patent law in practice. This result suggests that the higher the 
number of IP owners (in the form of ownership of patent or trademark rights) who 
attempt to commercialize their rights in a country, the higher the likelihood that 
they will apply pressure on public enforcement agents to effectively enforce their 
rights in a country. Furthermore, we find that higher levels of GDP per capita, R&D 
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expenditure and quality of human capital in a country also have a significantly 
positive effect on the strengthening of patent enforcement. Importantly, all five 
variables found to determine the strength of patent enforcement are variables that 
capture the level and quality of economic and social activity in a country, instead 
of more general variables that relate to e.g. the openness of an economy and 
political conditions. 
Second, we study the determinants of the strength of patent law, focusing on 
the time period since the signing of TRIPS, which was not captured in the study 
of Ginarte and Park (1997). We find that the two main determinants that were 
significant in the Ginarte and Park (1997) study, the level of development of a 
country and R&D expenditure, continue to have a positive effect on the strength 
of patent law. In addition, we find that the quality of human capital has a positive 
effect on the strength of patent law of a country. These are important findings that 
confirm the contemporary relevance of the Ginarte and Park (1997) study as well 
as highlight that some of the key determinants of strengthening levels of patent law 
continue to be the same as prior to the signing of TRIPS. Importantly, we also find 
that other variables which relate to the general economic and political conditions of 
a country such as market freedom, political freedom and openness do not have the 
expected effect on the strength of patent law anymore. The results showcase that 
after the signing of the TRIPS agreement, variables that relate to the general stance 
toward trade and the openness of a country no longer affect the strength of patent 
law, whereas variables that outline the footprint of the level and quality of economic 
and social activity in a country are important determinants. 
This paper offers a statistical analysis of determinants of the strength of patent 
enforcement at the national level. To develop better understanding of how 
patent enforcement can be strengthened, future research could devote effort in 
the following areas. First, researchers could develop case studies to identify the 
dynamics and mechanisms with which patent and trademark users from different 
industries and countries influence the development of stronger patent enforcement. 
For example, anecdotal evidence suggests that in the pre-TRIPS years, the global 
pharmaceutical industry was influential in lobbying for the strengthening of patent law 
internationally. The results of our study suggest that in the years after TRIPS, patent 
and trademark users from a variety of different industries may have influenced the 
strength of patent enforcement. Second, and related to the above, as more firms 
become active users of patents and trademarks in a country, future research could 
analyse the educational activities undertaken by the national IP Offices to support 
firms in managing, protecting and creating value from their IP and in exploring 
and exploiting the value of IP owned by others, legally and ethically. Such studies 
could identify the effect of different educational activities in stimulating IP usage and 
identify the best educational practices to help develop patent enforcement strength 
in other countries. 
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6. Policy implications
The findings of this study have two important implications for policymakers at the 
national and supranational levels. First, the results suggest that policymakers who 
aim to strengthen patent enforcement activities need to take actions to educate and 
incentivize innovative firms to become familiar with and seek to protect their rights in 
the country. As UNCTAD (2015, p. 65) highlights in its Investment Policy Framework 
for Sustainable Development report, “As national investors are frequently less aware 
of their IP rights, they should be sensitized on the issue”. Indeed, increasing the 
number of firms who actively engage with the patent and IP systems of the country 
will increase the number of firms who seek to commercialize their newly granted IP 
rights and who will monitor the market to identify when their rights are infringed by 
competitors. After identifying the infringement of their rights, the new IP owners as 
well as their collective industry associations will in turn apply pressure on the public 
patent enforcement agents who are responsible for enforcing patent law in practice 
(Yang et al., 2004). 
A successful example of providing incentives that aim to increase the number of 
users of a patent system at the national level is found in the targets of China’s 
12th five-year plan (2011-2015), which aimed to upgrade the capabilities of the 
Chinese manufacturing sector through scientific development. One of the targets 
was focused on providing monetary incentives to patent applicants, with an aim of 
increasing the number of patents in the country from 1.7 to 3.3 patents per 10,000 
people in the time period (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 
2011). This target equalled a 100 per cent increase in the numbers of patents 
granted. It aimed to enable Chinese firms to become familiar with the benefits of 
the Chinese patent system and to upgrade their manufacturing capabilities by 
commercializing their registered innovations (U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission, 2011). Indeed, now that the number of patent applications 
and patents granted in China has risen exponentially over the last years, one of 
the next areas of focus identified in the Chinese government’s 13th five-year plan 
period is to “ensure strict IPR protection” (SIPO, 2016). Policymakers from other 
countries could provide similar monetary incentives to the Chinese ones, in order 
to expand the number of users of their patent system, since in the long term, this is 
expected to lead to the strengthening of patent enforcement in a country.
At the supranational level, policymakers could also consider providing indirect 
monetary incentives that can incentivize patent activity, by exploring ways to expand 
the country coverage of patent protection and (if possible) adopt a regional fee 
structure for the filing and renewal of patents in a group of countries. For example, 
the European Patent Office is planning to launch the “Unitary Patent” in 2019, a new 
form of patent protection that allows IP owners to receive uniform patent protection 
in 26 member countries of the European Union (EU) for a significantly reduced fee 
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(EPO, 2018a). The unitary patent is expected to relieve innovators of the validation, 
translation and maintenance costs of patents in each of the 26 EU countries, at a 
reduced fee that covers patent protection in all countries. The overall registration 
and maintenance cost of a unitary patent for 20 years is expected to be €35,555, 
whereas the equivalent cost of patent registration and maintenance in each of the 
26 countries would be €169,667, a projected saving of €134,112 per patent (EPO, 
2018b).5 The European Patent Office (EPO) also provides subsidies for small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) and public research organizations, to incentivize them 
to register their rights (EPO, 2018a). National IP offices in other regions could follow 
the EPO’s example and explore potential collaboration with neighboring countries 
and make it easier for patent owners to efficiently and cost-effectively receive 
patent protection in neighboring countries. The Chinese State IP Office has signed 
agreements with neighboring IP offices such as that of Cambodia, which agreed 
to validate Chinese patents as of 28 March 2018, and that of the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, which agreed to recognize the Chinese patent examination 
results (Xinhua News, 2018a, 2018b). Such agreements further incentivize patenting 
activities by Chinese firms as patenting in China can enable the firms to easily 
expand their protection to other countries in the region.
With regard to the second recommendation, the findings of this study suggest that 
policymakers should aim to increase overall levels of R&D expenditure and invest 
in improving the quality of human capital in their country, since both will boost their 
country’s innovation capability, which in turn leads to increased demand for stronger 
patent enforcement. This is in line with UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Framework for 
Sustainable Development report (2015, p. 42), which highlights that “businesses 
are more likely to invest resources in R&D and technological upgrading if their 
innovations are protected”. Therefore whereas our first recommendation focused 
on increasing the capacity of IP owners in a country, our second recommendation 
focuses on increasing the quality of the innovation outputs of IP owners. Investing in 
these two factors is expected to enable firms to engage with higher-level and more 
advanced technologies that are more likely to require an effective patent system, so 
that patent owners can successfully commercialize their assets (UNCTAD, 2014).
Policymakers can consider incentivizing firms to invest more in R&D, particularly 
at the early experimental stages of research, which are riskier but, if successful, 
are expected to lead to the development of valuable IP assets. Contemporary 
studies generally find that R&D subsidies are expected to increase R&D output 
in the form of patents, especially in the European context (Buchman and Kaiser, 
2018; Szczygielski et al., 2017). With regards to the findings of firms located 
5 The estimates are provided by the EPO using the national renewal fees that were valid as of 1 January 
2017.
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in developed European countries, R&D subsidies were found to increase the 
number of collaborative R&D projects of German biotechnology firms (Broekel and 
Boschma, 2011) and boost their patenting activity (Buchman and Kaiser, 2018). 
The same positive effect is found for R&D subsidies to small and medium-sized 
Italian firms; however, the R&D subsidy cost required to produce one additional 
patent is high, ranging between €206,000 and €310,000 (Szczygielski et al., 2017). 
A similar positive effect between R&D subsidies and innovation is found for firms 
from European countries catching up on technology, such as Poland and Turkey 
(Bronzini and Pizelli, 2016).
An example of a successful R&D subsidy program is the Scientific Research 
and Experimental Development Tax Incentive Program (SR&ED) of the Canadian 
government which “encourages and supports scientific research and experimental 
development…by letting you deduct your SR&ED costs from your income for tax 
purposes” (Government of Canada, 2018). SR&ED incentives are considered an 
integral component of the Canadian innovation system, supporting innovative small 
and start-up businesses and attracting (and retaining) highly qualified human capital 
in the country (CPA, 2018). Importantly, such incentives can have a multiplying effect 
in terms of boosting investments in R&D, since successful projects are expected 
to attract further cycles of R&D funding from internal or external sources. Overall, 
when policymakers consider developing such policies to influence the determinants 
of patent enforcement, they also need to simultaneously undertake reforms that 
directly aim to improve the functioning and effectiveness of patent systems.
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